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Fundamentals of Partial Modal Logic 
JAN J AS PARS AND ELIAS THIJSSE 
I Introduction 
This chapter gives a picture of the happy marriage of partial and modal 
logic. Rather than presenting a survey of the entire field 1 , we focus on one 
type of partial modal logic. Here the models are the usual possible worlds 
structures (also known as Kripke models) where only the valuation function 
is partial. Validity can be characterized as relative truth. This paradigm 
is perhaps the most obvious way to combine the ideas of partiality and 
modality; most other approaches are variants of the one we are about to 
·liscuss. This style of partial modal logic is in our view perfectly suited 
for a whole range of applications. It should be noticed, however, that 
although only one way to do partial modal logic, our logic is still as flexible 
as normal modal logic, allowing for many different systems such as the 
"partial" counterparts of K, S4 and 85. 
Partiality and modality compared 
The contributions of Langholm and Meyer and Van Der Hoek (this volume, 
Chapters 1 and 3, respectively), provide sufficient motivation for the two 
relevant phenomena: partiality and modality. We now highlight some of 
the resemblances and differences between these aspects. 
Partiality and modality express two different dimensions of uncertainty 
with respect to a given piece of information. Partiality, the idea of not 
giving a (classical) truth value to every proposition, is at least different 
from modality in that it may not be reflected in the language: standard 
logical languages such as that of predicate calculus may be given a partial 
interpretation. So the basic inspiration for partial logic is .5emanlic. On 
1 See the historical notes at the end for bibliographical information. 
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F!Gt'RF. 1 Part1al model for Olp q) 
tlw otlH:r hand. m'Xliil![Y the i11Pa uf •:xprc'!:!sing the status of a proposition 
ne:ce:.!J5ti,ry or combination therpof). can and 3}1011ld 
be r<"flected m the modal. 
in thf' late fiftiios, modal 1og1c was 
:"~t·tiworN.H &!mantics. using the idea of po.~.~·ible worlds. Since the 
logic has ah;,i h!"f'n •:xtcmkd in order to deal with some 
Chapter l). the d1fforencc between 
~mam1c partiality is more or h7'ss car1ndled. 
miud that the bai>H'. mntlvdtiun b differN1t. 
n"sults for elementary a.nd modal logic, the 
dwtim:t1on b<:tWPH'< synt a:r. ( de<L1ction) and semantic:> ( conseq1wnee) is. 
m ~1m1- ;;f'U';;e, a 011•:. Mori:· C'Ml'ntial i~ the difference on the 
"''lU;;Lntic level Co!l"(Hfor scv1•rnl nvw!I nf mcomnlPte information: 
1.l As.same yt•U know p. hur you don't lmow anythmg ahouc 
q Thf'H ~' very model vPrifying till'! ,;ituation is ttw une in which 
modd re1.iresent"> th<· 
i1;fornH!.icm m the no1HnodaJ formula p. 
l.2 >i•·xt 5•1pp•1t<c you know ·pvr(, without knuv;m~ p or know·· 
y<1u have been told that •'ithPr Pat or Sn.-. wHl n;UH' to 
y•:i1n pa.ny, but not which nf rhP 1:wQ. A prnpo1:>iliunal mod••i such as i pi nr 
•.... J 
q now do<'S not. !lt the i:;ituation, and iu fact it can eaJ:>1!y b•: shown that no 
~ndi mod!'! 1•x1;o;ts r•very prnp•.Y;:11tional rnodd tint vi•rilies p 'i q mthPr ver· 
ifi?S p or vt.:rifif':> '/, and therefr.>rf' would imply te>u mur:h krniw!edi;1;e. Her•.' 
a Krip1.e moJel !5 callt'tl for. ',ee filfUH' l 
Thesr 
circnn,i~ tauces. 
th!:' tW•) im(1 OlW 
:-nance I" the morf' OIH~'{ 
Why combine partiality and modality? 
h is trut> that the nr:u;lµdi:fP COiltaiHf-d iH 
m poss1tJk world ~tnH·tnrn s11ch a.s in 
ar" appro-
m• •tivation 
L l could also be modP!ed 
Yt't it ;,hm1id lw rmti>d at tins point that the two structun•s do not 
c._. 
p, -,q p.q 
f'!Gl.'RE 2 Partial Kripkc model for p 
model the same thing: the propositional struct11re !EJ mndels the plain 
information p, the above possible world structure the agent's knowledge 
Op. Apart from the gap between a simple proposition and the knowledge 
thereof. and differences of propositional theory (for example, whereas the 
latter model verifies -.p'/q, the fonner does not) the distinction is relatively 
harmfoss in the pres1mt case. Bm in general th1!re is a clear difference 
bd.ween the two. This is not only clear from our second example, but 
particularly in cases where the two are compared (e.g. in Op~ p), when 
!>OIIW form of intro::.pection is required (e.g. Op ~· Dfl7J). and in case,; 
sevPral agents (e.g. n,,obp). 
Still. this unly proves the need for modal logic. vVhy partialize it'' There 
are ~nme very reasons for so: 
Naturalne!l!l \Ve belteve thP partial apprnach to tw mueh mon~ 
not only in its basic elern•:nt-. (parlial worlds as nwntal reconstruc-
tions of the r~al world), but also in its b•!havior with respPct to differ· 
ent phenonwna. Partial Kripke-style scmanttcs has bet>n pmpnscd for 
logic prc•gramming Przymusinski 1!)8!J and Gelfond 1002), where 
a natural int(!rpretatwn is provided for logic pro1r,rnms with 
(Pearce <HHl \Vagnn 19DO) 1.md d1sjmictiou ( MiHkt>r l!J82). 
So'e also. Busch's contribution in Chaptl'f '.! 1;f this volume, wlwno 
buth thwe·valiwd and intnitiouistic iow:it: arc us<«i as a basis fr,r 
prugran1n1ing .st)u1antic·~. 
I·~fficic•ncy Classical pnssib!P world SP1rnmtics h•a1b to a combinatorial cx-
the less om• kWJ\V'I, t.lw liiggl'r the moth•I. Fur exampk•, com-
plete ignorann• of n propo:-,1twnal variables leads tu at least 2" differ-
ent worlds needed for a mr)dei that only reprt>sent:; what one know;;. 
See Thih;;e ( liJ[l:!) for a ,;tudy of partial model;; that d1aracterin• 
of kuowledll'.e In addit1ljn, w•· rPfor to 
in otlwr partial 
modal 
Flexibility Addition of can be acconnt ed for in 
two wa:ri: dimination of pn<;:;ible v:Qrlds and ext••nsion of propo':li-
t.iunal valuation. (see Jaspar~, 199 l i. 
Adequacy Although dai.sical and partial modal logic are ~irnilar to some 
exti·nt. tlwre are some int,.resting differences regarding the deductive 
systems. For a number of apIJlications, such n.s natural language 
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!:!t>mantic;:; (d. Barwise 1981 and ~1uskens 1995 j and awaT0ner;s 
(see Thijsse, Chapt•?r 8 uf thi!i rnlumi>). th1'5e diff,,rences make µani:il 
sem<intics prefemble 
Partial and classical logic compared 
Though quit'! similar ro the modal system K. the partial modal Jogk l\I 
·esentwl hen· is diffr~n:'ut in a mnnber of ways 
the most. efli>f'ntial differf'nt'f' i~ that M has ( aimost.) rw val11i 
This ran be illustratN! miing thi:' cla.Nsical tautology p ·1 ~p: 
tertzum rum datur does not. hold, i:iiIJCP the formula i!i not true wh1;n p is 
•.mdefiued. As we will se<e, it can Pabily be shown that hardly au:v formula 
is always true, for the ~<'nmtv" valuation, which leaves all 
variablt~s unddinrd, al!:!o 
Now where i!> the 
th<1t though (standard) formulas are 1mt 
For example, !.he rule n rnntradictum£> sFqmtur q1wdlibd (abo 
known M 'ex fa!B</) ,;, f .. -.'ro '? •/' still hnlds: if the premiRr• is tnw. so is 
t bf: consequent (for Lh1s prmnif~e cannot be t me l Indeed mosr. classical 
rules trarn1fer to partial (modal) 
ru!P of excluded middle: I{' ~ f' V •.p. Since the De 
1, ~'P) {"? p v ~.p is valid. all this implies that 
hold. 2 Although thiH is a major departure from da.,sical logk. we do not 
see any a pri01'i reason why contraposition should b<~ a rn•ces.<>ary ingredient 
of a logical system. 
The asymmetry in the inferential system, revealed hy the 
contraposition, has the effect t,hat contraposition has to be 
in each case where it applies. Ft:;r example, to formulate ttw 
logic of pre-orderr'd (reflexive + transitive) frames, the hasir rule system 
M has to be extended wit.h the ru!Ps: 
(T) Dip ~ 'f'· 'P ""~ <><P 
(4) D<f 4> 001f, OC;;cp ~ Oip. 
Such so-callPd frame completeness therefore usuall.v im:olves pairs of 
dual rules. Exceptions are ex fal.rn, of course, and self-dual rnles such 
as D<p ~~ O<p (D) a.ud OO'f' ·0 ? 0<)9 ( G), which apperu- as single rules. 
By turning to the weaker uotion of model completcnN>s, we will show in 
section 5 how to capture oth"'r single rules, such as 
For several applications, such as modelling explicit 
lief, absence of contra.position is au advantage of partial modal 1og1c, rorn· 
pared with classical modal logic. If C1'f is interpreted M 'knowing that :;', 
we would like to have the veridicality principle LJ;p * '/). s1winll: that all 
f 
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Neverthek·f!s r-' '-"} ~;c,..m . .; be tw> ;}trnmi; in 
of mod a.! opr'rato: s The l!J.tt"r rnli, 
agent. It wou!ri 
full awari"n•'S" of •mch ap,enti:i to n•;ison alViut the t''"""wrn•., 
truths \Yitivmt thi;; strong 
hold for cun:>nous " 
Before WI' return to th:s issur. Wf' will d1.41w'· the rn.rni;1m.ge, 
i.uference sv;;H•rn for n.utia.I modal 
2 Syntax and semantics 
2. 1 Th<' modal langua~e 
As noticed in th<' imroduct1on. th« 
rnndal ~i".;;~tuin?if variahlt-:,1±1~ 
'fh~ lan};tH~g:~ [, t ht_- r1f ... ~~ea .. furnv-:d 
. (' [ 
• pc [ 
• it ·p ( £ then. -~:p 
• if ..p, l/' .:; [. th•'!l l:t 
"' then d<'hw'd rf'curs1velv bv: 
C 
• no 0ther elf'm«ntg mcm· in L tbnu th•.>-W 
above 
( )r, ln cnnns<' 1') 
.,. :p ~ ·+-,11 
This is the basic languag1•, which nrn be ioxtenrlt:d in 
that ;yr-rve ft--,;; abbr~viatiouB n.t1d (ii) \Vlth 11flW 
tlw following ddimtlon:; 
• 
• :p v ~\ :;,_"";~ '-""1( /\ 
• ()tp :::..:: -.,;:J --;c; 
th.t::o 
As for (ii), the can he extended •1v1th the i-:tdu:&lon nt'l!.<•twn 
in .Cr".,. In additit.::tn, co1tsta.nt~ flHty be rf-'111-ttved frnm Lhe lan~urrn:rt" 
rerno>ing -;··· n"SUltc. i11 C, 
th•' foH<.nviug notation will b•• mefol The conJuni:-tion 
OV<'f all dement.'I of r~ fini1.e SN r will be written M r 
0 ...,, T and '\)/ 0 J If c l.h a unary 
then er fr+ i ;:: r} and r-r = 
2.2 Partial moddi; and their propertit;!S 
In partial modal cwmanti<'.11 on@ often (If 
.u~+~ .. "~~;r.n~~, ,,.r1tht=f" th~n nf i1t~lhlt"' v..~orld~: tbe vah1~uon t<:1 
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:it-man ties { cf. Barwise 198 l and :\1usken.~ 1995) and awarnnf'ss 
Chapter 8 (Jf this volum<>). thPst'. difference~ make pan ial 
Partial and classical logic compared 
quite similar to th(' rrwdal >1ystem K. the partial 1m1dal log;ic lVI 
preseutml here is difff'rent in a number of ways 
Perhaps the most c11sl'ntial differ!' nee is that M has (alnwst) no u1dui 
formula.'!. This can be ilhrntrati-'d u~ing the claRsical tautology p ·/ ~,p: 
tertimn non datur doros not hold, sine" the funnula is uot true when p is 
undefined. As we will 1>er1, it can i>asily be shown that hardly any fr1rrn11l11 
is always true, for tiw "r,rnpty" valnatinn, which leaves all 
variables unddirn•d, ahm produce;; a gap for every formuhi in sume st<mdard 
(modal) 
Now where is th(' similarity betwe1.•n clas!!irnl a.ml partial 
that thouith (iitandard) formulas an• not vaLd, mkrcru:e ri1lr.~ 
the rule n: i:ontrndu:tume sFqmtur 
as 'r:x fahio') p ,A. -· •. p "'"" ;J· still hulcls: if the 
Notice 
may 'ltiU 
t hP n1ri:;1•qucnt (for this pr<'mise cannot bF trne I. Indeed most classical 
rules transfer to partial lu1odal) One noticeable excnption is thr 
rulP of •:xcluded middle: 1{J t> p v '<f· SirH:f; the De :.Iorgan propr>rty 
'P /\ -.p) ~~ /fJ V "''/: is valid, ail thi;; implies that contrnp•mition does not 
hold. 2 Although this is a major departure from classical logic. we dn not 
see any a prion rr:ason why cuntraposit.ion should bf• a nPcess;i.ry 
of a logical system. 
The asymmetry in the inferential system, revealed hy thP absern:e of 
contraposition. ha.~ the effect t.hat comraposition has to be 
in each Casl' where it applies. For example. to formulate the 
of pre-ordered (reflexiw• + transitive) frames, the basic rule system 
M has to be extended with the rules: 
(T) Di;~.,. tf, 'P * 
(4) Dip o=? OC<p, 00'{> """ Oy;. 
Such so-callf;d frame completeness thPrefore usuaHy involves pairs of 
dual rules. Exceptions are ex faLm. of course, and self-dual rules such 
a-5 D<p ••? O'f (D) a.n<l OO;p ~ 00.p (G), which appear as single rules. 
By turning to the weaker notion of model cornpletenei;s, we will show in 
section 5 how to capture other single rules, such as D<p ~ 'P· 
For several applications, such as modelliug explicit 
lief, absence of contraposition is an advantage of partia.l modal 1og1c. com-
pared with da.<;i;ical modal logic. If n,c is interpreted M 'knowing that ;:', 
we would like to have the veridicality principle Op '* :p, saying that all 
----~~·---·-~·----a-~-
Blarney (1986j. Sei' alw Langholm. Chapter l of this volume 
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kmiw5 is tnw. :s'Pvt'rthdess :;> ().,; sr(•Hb W he tOQ l>!tunv, in 
interpri'T ation of modal 11peratoi:;. Tlw !atti>r n1h• 
··very a;c"nt. It would 
full awarE>ll!'"~ of <sud1 agents to rni150D about the 
trnth~ \Vit1111ut tilt'< "'tro11g 
hnld for n1usci1ms ; ~ is no 
Before we return to this i:;sur. v;e wil! definr• th(' 
infon'nce !:yste-tn for naxtlal rnc.Hia! 
2 Syntax and semantics 
2.1 The modal language 
As notkNI in tiu• irnrodncuon. 
modal Imrie. Let P be a wtriahk:s, aml 
~-·1 rnn3tants. Tlw lanl':uag<' C U1•· of wel!-form<'d 
ic. th"n dPfiut'd rf'rm1,ivPlv 
• TE [ 
oP(:,c 
• if,,::; £. t!wr1 ·4 ,p 1= L: am! E C 
• if;, i;..·.:: [ then ,:; ;\ vJ E: C 
• no ntlu~r Plt:iments ottur in C than tb 11_;~r 
above 
Or, in concis•' 1' E 'Pi 
;: I JI I ( ;,c 
the 
Thb is the ba;;k languil.g«', which can t'XL•'.mied in tv.o wnh 
that c;Pr.'•' a·; abhrevi1,tiun;1 nnd iii i with nr•w for fi}. 
tlie following definition§ 
• 
• p v ~l ::-· -,( --1; /" 
• ()-.p ~:.:_. ~-a[~) ·4:;-
A:; for Ol J, tht• Gill hi" exwnded with th1: ,;xd•1sim1 
resulting in£ ..... In addition, cum;trwt.s ni;:i.y t.w rPmuv••d from the h;nguage:, 
for example, removing -:- n~ults in £ r 
th0 followmg notMiou will he U1'>efui. T!11> cm1junctiou (dis-
ovfff all element~ of a finite SN r w1H U<" v:ritt~n as /'ft, r l', ); /'fl. 'i\ = T and \'(/ 0 ''" .:... If c lh a m1r.ry !u~lr:il mmtam !for 
then d' fr;,:: l.:; E fl and c-"r ·= tt.7 ! c.,;,: Fr 
2.2 Partial model£ and their propHrties 
In partial modal semanticl'I on•• often 
situation,,·) rather than of p~mte 
of \!Vnr!li;,' (or ·coherent 
world;;: th•~ valuation s1mrn::t'\'f•d to 
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manifest itself in the worlds However, WP usually refer to these indices 
11$ 'worlds' simpltczter. A:s in d11s.-;ical possible world semantics. a partial 
Kripkt' model Ai is a triple (l1'". R, 1/}, whf'tP 1.Y is the si>t of worlds. R 
iv x l'V an accessibility relation betw<'cn worlds, and the valuation l' i!; 
now a partial function from P x lV into tht' SN of cl<tbsic'al truth values 
1}. ThP i~raph /li'. R) is calh~d th1• frame of the model. 
Since a formula may b1• neither true nor foil'<'. the rnPanmg of 
constants cannot be spdled out by truth condilwns alor!f'. and faL~ity condi-
tions have tu be added: apart frnm thP re!>triction of coh!'rencc. truth and 
falsity are independent. Here the partial truth rP!ation between worlds aud 
formulas 1s denotf!d by f.c~. tlw falsity rc>lation by d :i Thf' truth and 
conditiorn; for£ are recufoivelv definPd by: (for arbitrary Af "'' (iv. R, \'), 
Al, w ~- T Af.w AT 
1W, w r.c: p -t·~ V(p. w) l 
M, w f- -·+o ~ .H. w :9 ; 
M 1r :.9 p ~ \'(p. w) ·~ O 
.\f. w ·~ -..,:: q ,\!, w ~"'· { 
Al, w h: ,_, /\ !j) "'~ A/. IJ! r·· p and AI, Ill ~ 11· 
Af, 1r -~ •r 1, ,,.. ~ .'1, w •4 '.P or ]\,f, w ~ U' 
l1f. w [1,f; ~· Vv. wH1.• .\l.1· I= .p 
Al. H' ~~ [J:; = .::v · wRc and .H. v ! f 
From thf~se Tnrskian nmditions the truth and 
connectives immediaJely follow. 
dausr>s for thl' oth.,r 
M. u· \;L l ;\i. w "i l. 
.W. u: f"" ;; \/ t;,' ~, Ai. w f"' ·.p or Ai, 11• f" !f.·· 
11· :=j +• V 11' ~ Al. w '9 + and M. w :::cj lJ1 
,\J, lL" ~· ().p '-"'Ju . u•Rr and 1\I, v p •f 
A1, w ~ Oc;; ~ tfu: wRe ~ M. v --j :; 
Al vcrij!e.Y (or ~atisjie.,, .rnpport.~) ;; in w whenever .H. w ~·· .,:. Al 
(or re1ects) ;; in w whenever 1'.1, w .:j ; When Jf, u• If .p and ,u. w fl ,J. 
'Pi~ said to be undf'jinPd on M in w. If r <:; £ then :\!, u; f-. r m0ans that 
for all -: C r: M, w p -, . 
A number of ohiwrvations may h<'lp to gain &ornP insight into thifl matter 
Semantic properties 
First, notice that the given form of partial semantics is a cnrrec1 genf'r-
alization of da;;sical semantics, sinrP a partial model is a geuuinf' 
model when F is a total function. 
Observation 2.1 (Classicality) IfA1 •: \H',R. \.; w t.l. l': p,,, 
VV ---t {0.1 }. thrn Ai, w r· .p <'> 1\.i, w ii +for all•; f:. l 
(The proof is by induction on tlw structure of :p.) 
-----------.. ---·---·-----~ Alt~rnnlive notations for F and ~ ai·e: and ~-·, f'o-r ii.nd f~p, and I=. and ii4 . 
r 
I 
Fu~riA:>.H'tHALS OF PARTI:\l MnL:A: Loew IF 
R 
w • 
-
• 1' 
i __ ,.-:, T 
R 
11:' • 
-
• l 
FIG!:HE :J Propreitional extension vs MC~~ibility 
Om• prnp0rty for classical mor!r+s is Pven transf!·rPd to tht· 
semantics: the as!lie:nment of truth or 
r1msi'lt1>nt ly 
Observation 2.2 For no Al, 'I',·; . !L a•id :\L 1r .. 
Tii avoid the lS Ud! that much d:lfrr· 
ent from dassiral logic, we note a hut g;en<'rai ra"'' of :mdl:'fine<.ll!e"" 
Thtrr' is 11 model !l.f 1.md a world 11.'u s1.vh 
,\1, wo I* ~: rm1i M 1L, A ,: 
Proof Corniir!er a "nn informn.tim/' 
empty world· lH H' = { u·o}, 
p '~ 'P. The observati"n t!wn follow;, 
modd wi1 h a sni;;l" i o;df·acn'S''i!h• I 
and l'(p, i bP !HH.ldhwd for c.!l 
inrl11ct ion on the structurr •Jf ;· 
So thl'rP are no :,o-caHed formula.« (h•lllt np frnm tin· £1lVc·n cimslants 
except for ~ J which aH va.lid lu other v:<nd,,, all 
dnive from - . 
A final important property of partial 'Wmanties rn rdated to Pxter;smn 
of mformation. ie further ~pP<"ifkation of trnth valnPs for 
variables. So. Wi' introduce 
< u·M '~ w'.w \/'ip, cc- F{p.1r) for p 
defiued. Thi;, ddh1iti•>n. however, does not smt tlie mudal 
wrlL for wf' wnnl<l like this extPn;rion to hold for arbitrarv modal formultl..~ 
( S<J...Called fJf'l'liiSlt'nCt'.) 
To see that <, dof'!\ nnt pnxlncP the desired persistence, 5uppoSf• fur 
sake tlmt we have a rn.o<ld in which w t--· r-:p. w < i.r' and 
there is only one t' such that wRv So v f'" p. Then for any c' ;.1«lnd1 is 
R-accessible from u/, v' f .. p should hold, bnt forrr~ i.· < 1' therr 
is no compf'!ling refulon win' the relations in the of :1 ~h.,nld 
eommntP. 
One way to sohT· this is 
we may define a 
the same frame. I.e .. if .W 
to !itrengthen th£, relation of f:Xte1wHm. tor 
exten."iion of ont> model to imothcr based on 
H. 'V), Al' '"" {lt', R, l"') and w,1,.1 -:~ M 
for Ill! ii: E ~V, then induction for all formula~ .p: 
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lvl z 
v • ... 
+ 
·~~-·i' 
R 
·-~ I<' z 
FIGU!HI ·I ffomnulation 
R' 
·-· ... I :J 
M' 
A1. w r· ; ;::;, ,\of'' H ~"' ,,~ anrl Af. w '"i "* M'' s '1 {: 
A more llexibll' solution. also nsPful fo1 mtffrwl persistPfH'.f' wluch fails 
in I hr above coumicr-Pxampl!e. is to move to the mon: subtle relation of 
bisimulation ext1'nt<iou. This notion i:i in bootwPen tlw i>ntirPly local propo-
sitional <'XtP11siun and the fully global extension. The intermediate notion 
relates two worlds if their resnectiw ( n-sten) alternatives arf' related by 
we reint rodure the notion nf 
bisinmlatiou. 
Definition 2.1 A relatiun Z lF ,, Vil' Le, a bi.mnulatwn (or 
nection') bctwe1m two fram1's !l-F. Il) and ( W 1 , R'} iff 
con-
1. (u.•Zw' nnd wR!') ==;> :J1/: (vZu' and w' R'u') for all u" t·;:: H', w' (CH" 
2. ( wZ w' and w' R'u') ~ 3v : ( vZ u' a!ld wRvJ for all w E ii', w', ·u' E H/' 
This definition may be darificc! by refornmlating thf' mnditions in rnlfl.-
tional aigdmi. If the relatiunal composition R1 • R.2 denotes { (.r. tJ) I ':lz : 
xR 1 z and zR2y}, and the reversal z- "" {(y,x) I (;r,y/ E: Z}, then the 
above conditions amount to: z·- • R <; R' • z- and Z • R' <;: H • Z. The 
hack-and-forth nature of bisimulation n1.11 be seen as two ways to draw the 
arrows in the diagram of Figure 4. 
Bisimulation or modal extension ran now be structura!lv defined. 
Definition 2.2 (.'.'lifodal ext.ension Let I'.f = {W, R, V) and M 1 
{W', R', V') be partial Kripke models. Then v: M i;;; w~1 • (i.e. w in M 
is extended to w' in Af' J iff there exists a blliirnulation Z between (i'V. R) 
and {Yin, R.') such that wZw' and 
Vv E Ho', v' C H'' : vZv' --> vM :S: 
\Vhen Af = A1', w M ~ w'.'1 is writteu as w i;:, M ir'. 
1' 1 ~DA~~H~~"'llTAt.s dF 1~.!.h'f!At \1unAt Lt.,rac / ll!J 
Ob8ervation 2.il In Ut (J, 'f•YPh'f'fiPY nrut trtJ,f1~ttlVf5 
relation, IJYi th» clas8 of model-trndd pa,rs nu.; thu1· 
the identttv n.latwn ~, J: y a ln,qmwlatirm on ;\I. tht compo.Htum 
of two bi.>m111/r1twr1 .. ; !.~ '" fnsunufotwn. mui 1s ri 
u gnu1 modti M. C~M is a ff 
;\ow for lrnilm11iariun extenstnn we !i;1v•' th•· t1.0 ;,:1r<'d prt·'""rvatiml pro:µf·rty 
Observation 2.5 : l'Pre;ist<"ll«Pl thni Jf. 11 ··;. JI'. 
p for· all .; ( 4 
1. As usual in 
over the l'lmm 
;,mrnltruw<>n" mducnnr. 
:\!', u:' 
\Vitho11t into this mart•·r. wP nr.t;n• rhat hi.sirrmb.tion;i 
Z i% a frame- hi~irm:lation su.d1 t!vH u.· Z ,,,' 
\/(u:) \ 7 <111 1 ) an important n·~ait. Risiumiati.m inntn-
anf'>; is crmi,id(•ffd tn lip the diaract,,ristic of tlw mudal 
rn tht> frai;;,mrnl 1Jf th•· fir;,! ordPr 1':h1ch umtams tr:m!'lations of 
modal formnlas, b;Lc;Pd rm t lw ~.tawianl trn! h ;1nd nmditi<•lF· Th,: 
translations.. ru>d thf'rf'f•·Tf· th•.· ri"',1!L 
For exa1nul~'". a ~in11L1r l:~ ,rro:1hzr"t~ itY£l 
l\foorf' ( l (J~O 
Logical consequence 
coILsider 
r.kfilwd t hi" rnod1°l•; ;ind th<•ir pn1fH'rt "~· Im'.. I.Wt the 
eun•,»qu..-·nn·. TlH• not!on or valid cn11",..'i"fllC'' • har. Wt:' 
mtuitiv•~ ;md useful ftor .ipphcatiun~ is what i'I c;ilu-ti 
strvng ~on3t'tfUt-:tirP. \.Vliich an1ou.nt~ to n:Litiv~:> Vf'lrihrati11H {r,f onr~ ,,t the 
concln:;imrn, Kiv1~11 tlw truth oft hr pr<'mi•w11 J b w'nNai th· da:<>"' <:f re!••, am 
mu<lelJ; matter~. lY1 M he th.- da.""' nf m•><h·b ( an 
"ubda .. •;s of M. 
Definition 2.3 l.'Ollil<:fjlll'!Ji'!" l r '. ( ~ it! for ,,a \1 c and 
in Af; if ,\f. lL' P" r t hPll .\1. II' t. ;j for c;nrne .. ;'.:J. 
HnP ar1• a nnmL•?r ,,f t~ pical t::>rnmplf?>', ;1•;me 
m1•ntinm'd in thP mt.rnrlnrtion (hv default. M is 
• 0 ~-: ·:· for . but y" 
• ·;;. ,,_,¥-, r 
• O{.; f. 
• LJ~,, /\ fJt'; 'i j 
• CJ,,: /\ ">Ii' f= <>{ .,, U'l and V 
4'I }w cr1nv~r~ n:-Eult t·an a.li»-0 hP sW:.rN~~ wh-eu thl' ..,.., fimt«· d Thij"'" ! 
h1?1t!l.l 
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3 Derivation 
We will use a sequl'ntial formulation for deduction in partial modal logic. 
Thi: dcrivability relation ,. is a relation hmween two sets of formulas. r ~- 6 
denotes that Cl. is derivable from l". Such an expression is called a t1cqucrit.:> 
3.1 Sequential rules fur M 
The basic logic corresponding to strong co1J.Sequence on arhitrnry partial 
Kripke models is called 1'-1 Systi!m 1\1 ls triggered by the following sequeu-
tial rules. The only structural rules am the START rule and two monotonic-
ity rules. L-t-.!ON and R-!;;lON F11rthermon· the CFT rule is µre;;ent. 
r' IL-Mm:) .6.' ilH\lON) 
As mmal. the int.roducLion rult>1-1 for the logical constant;, are not only sep-
arated into lf'ft and right rulPs, but dn<' tu partiality now al~o into TRF!:. 
and FALsg rules. 
[,r.p ,- t. 
--(-::;;p~-:s.-
(L-THl.'E 
fL-FALSE ---i) 
1.L-Tfffr'. l,) 
r. --.p r Ll r. 'o!,l• -· il 
r. •(.p _,, •/J)' c. IL-FAL!>E A.) 
(L-FALSL ']) 
i R·F'ALSE ·•i r r· 2.. r" -i1:p 1 
I "' ~-------,:; . .:.? ( H-TR\_'.E •'· ) 
( ll-FAl.SE •'·) 
FALSE rules havf' a m;gation prPcediug the constant introduced. So 
every constant may have fonr sequemial r11ll"s. Yet not all ;mdi rn!Ps are 
pre.'ient. sometimes surh absence hints at an esi;ential departure of 
reduc:e the number of l!tructura1 rules, thP. arguments tJf t- arf<' taken tn he ~t.~rn 
rather than sequenc!'s. 
5 Jnstead of r <.){.>}and r ..::.. vm writ.: r. p :inrl r. ~respectively. 
FLNDAMEl'T.".L'l OF PA!ITlAL .\ioOAL L<x.ic 121 
from das.~ical lngic: ~ometimes a ( weakf·r) rule may be dl"n'raJik. e.g from 
the structnnd rules. 
Definition 3.1 A !if'! of formulas Li. is 'I\1-dr:rirnb/F from ruHAher !IN of 
formulas r wheUt"Vf'l" r f- L'.:.. following Ii finite UU!I!ber of Of 
thP rult·s above. The rdation IS denoH:d a" r ;~JI.! ii.. 
Theorem 3.2 (Soundness of '.I.I) r M ~ -? r f'" M 21. 
\Ve ban' to sh•)W that thi' rules of l\J presnv1~ valid corn~eqncnt«>. 
To illustrate the J.!l"l.JCC·dun• WT dieck the R· TIH E rnlf' lYt r f'"'~'l ,.:, ·.6. 
This says that aJl worlds which support tlw ii e n V•'rlfv .,: ()f' 
at h:ast oue of the elemeuts f:,f .6. that ;\[ .,_-_ rii. R. 
cont.airrn a world w E il' which supports nr So all v f: W whkh Ml" 
acn•ssibl;: from !L' suppnrt an r!!.'mPntl'l of r Be<·au<: .. ; r F'M ·.,: -.6.. we 
know that all ;u-cPssible v innst support ·+:. or th•±re exi~.ts an acee:>>iible 
which falsifies somf: dC'mem r1f ..'.!.. In the formn casf• we obrnin :.t. 11' 
in Lh<' latter 1\f. 11 r· .,oo for "'•Ill<" •) C .":i. H•w:e r.Jr f"M ··O.l 
3.2 Some properties of l\I 
Tlw givni SPCJ1H'nt system c!Parly marks !hi" diffne11rP v,·irh d;;.;'.sical modal 
This boil~ down to tlw ah<;1•1we uf t.h•.· ft· THI T --n1h' 
t fw !a"w of exduded mi<.kll,.. ! tfrt,am d11tw·; !ifJt 
hold: ifM ·.- v ·c,.:. :"f•Vrrthekss tht•re :;llil 
such as De 
tat i vity. a.b;;orpti1111 
will bf' nsed in this 
Obi:;ervntion 3.1 
• !' '· M 2. and .~ 
• r r·M .6. and 
r:MW...'.l. 
Mr M...:i. 
• I".+· "M ;:.\ ,_:;, !.:!", .-M <)~ IL- l Hl"E 
• f~-M ;).~ 
•<>.:.•M~I 
r·•n"' 
• --rvl ' ' 1 
or ' M CLp. <>...:i. 
The transformation of L·FALSF iutu L-'; Rt'E 
,,-ahd 
will also be a~r-d frl:'-
H..ecall that :wme srquent rull"S arr unt ind udr•d m t h+- li..-;t of rn!es 
for l\11 be,.ause they are redundant: for uxampll" (L-FALS!: ) [. ~ T .:,l b 
derivable (from R-TR.m.: T and r..-nwE ., 
Another important property of l'vl i.~ its fiuitenes.5, Thrn leads to what 
we will call thl:' finiteness propt<rty throuJl;hout thi.5 
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Observation 3.2 (Finiteness property) If r 1-M ~ then there exist finite subsets f' <;;; [ and bi' c;: ~ such that f' f-M b.'. Since M-derivability is defined by making only a finite number of derivation steps, this can be proved by induction on the length of derivations. 3.3 Another sequential format Jru;tead of separating the introduction rules inLo TRt:E and J:oALSE rnlcs, we could also define two derivation relations, or use the four-place nota-tion used by Langholm in Chapter l of this volume. In addition to true premises and true consequencPs, Langholm's quadrants contain two posi-tions indicating falsity of other premises and consequence!'. So a sequent r. -,b, t- E, -.e (in our notation) is reformulated as 
flE 
11 I e · 
The obvious effert of the four-place notation is that the l'Xtra negations featuring in our MLSE-rules are eliminated in the quadrant notation. Thr> price to pay i5 that in the latter notation one has to specify more positions, while departing from the traditional two-placr> notation. An inference rule in the quadrant notation has the following format: I'i I E1 r n I~ r' I E' -~e-;- and ... and A,. 19~ .. =-> A' \ 91 . 
In our sequential format the rule is expressed a.s: r1.~A1:...'L1.~e1 ... f,.,...,[).,.1-I;.,,...,en r , ~A' 1- :r' ..... e' 
For example, L-FALSE O corresponds to the following four-place inference rule: 
r \ :r or I oE A. <P e '=> OA, D;p oe 
The L-TRUE -. can even be incorporated a.s a structural rule: 
r \ E1. E2 r I E2 A e ~ A,E1 e . 
An advantage of this four-place va.ria.nt is that the other introduction rules of system M show a nic.e symmetry. For example, L-TRLE /\ and R·FALSE /\ reappear as "north-west'' and "'south-east" ruli'Ji: r,.p,wp:: r,.ptq/!\E d I I E r I z: _ · - ;> A e an A e . .p, fi.' => .1. e. '-I' A. IP It is a matter of taste which notation is preferable-we will stkk to the explicit TRU&FAL5E distinction in sequential rules. 
FUNDAMENTALS OF PAR:rlAL ~fODAL LOGIC / 123 4 Saturation, completeness and decidability In classical logic tht notion of a TTUU'lmally consistent set is an essential ingredient of Henkin-style completeness proofs. This is also the case for dMsical mo<lal logic. Such a set of formulas is consutmt with respect to the underlying logic. and it is maximal in the sell!le that it does not have consistent Pxtensions. '.\.faximally consistent sets enablP us to get a grip on the sem!llltic units, surh as worlds in modal logic or interpretatioru; and as.~ignments in predicate logic. In other words, maximally consistent scu relate syntax and ~mantics. Completen<'Ss is then derived by making two steps. 
One of these steps guarantt'eS that a maximally consistent !let \"erifies the forrn11la.<1 which are contained by it. This ensures that such a set dO<'S indeed behavr like a world. This result i..; called the troth lemma.. The other step, which is normally made firn. is <·ailed the Lindenbaum Lemma, and stat~ that every con.!!istf'nt st>t can be extrndetl to a maxi-mally consistent !Wt. Th.- proof of this result prorf'l>ds by adding as much information to a given consistent set a.'> pos:;ible. i.e. without IMing t·onsis-tency 
Then the gpneral strategy of the Henkin completeness proof l!I a." follows. In order to show that r ~ 'f ~ f 1- i. we prove that r If 'f => f ~ .; So assume that cp is not derivable from L Then. still in dasi;ica.l logic. r u { ""'.P} is consistent. Hy the Lindenbaum Lemma w·e know that there PXist.5 a maximally consistent ext«>rusion of r u { ~.p }, say f*. Thi' truth lemma tells \L'> that r· VPrifies all elements of r hut not ,: . Therefore' r·. interpreted as a world. ~hows that .,:: is nut a valid consequence of r. Although the general !ltructure of the Henkin mmpletenl!S!I proof for partial logir is the :;ame. there a.re a number of difff:'rences due- to the ab&'nce of tertium nan datur. For example. if r ~I .,: thl'n-f -J { ~.:} may be inconsistent. To wit p Ii qV-.q. but {p. -.(qV-.q)} is inmnsistent. Therefore we need a generalization of the Lindenbaum IA.'mma: if r 'i >' then r can be extended to a <'anonical set r· which does not include ;; . l'ow what precisely are the canonical setll uf partial logic'! 
4.1 Saturated sets 
In partial logir maximal consistency is not dLe correct characteristic of the syntactic counLerpa.rts of worlds. In fact we have to bf' more liberal in accepting sets of formulas as valuations or worlds It could be the cue that a formula y> is neither verified nor falsified. So, if we want to imitate such a phenomenon by m«'ans of sets of formulas, then these canonical sets do not have to be maximally coruJistent. The following definition of 1aturated seta gives the corret't syntactic analogllt' of partial worlds. Definition 4.1 Let S be a sequential dt'rivation 11ystem for a la.nguqe C.. 
• A set c1f formulas r <: £
 is said tt• be S-811turateri
 ifI for all .6. '.::: £ 
r >-s .'.). ""'' il r. r i 0. 
• A set of formulas r £.. £ is s
aid to be S·cormstrnt iff r 
7s 0 
saturation !will, down to
 maximal con-
sistency, so 'satnration
' generalizeg ·maximal 
consis1r:rn:y·. B<.fori> giv
ing a 
reformulation ()f t.h<' notion of 'sa
turated set'. Wfl uou• th
at 
be expressc~d m many diflu<>
nt ways. for 
Observation 4.1 If 11 scqurnf .~ys
tnn S contam.~ H·MO!\' and W
itH fort911ag1 
£. thl"n r C: C is ron:m;tent 
1jf I' if D. for some t:. <;., C If S 
1;.rtl'!nds M 
then[' IS C01M1Sfent ~·>I' r/ ~ .. 
?'~ l' ~j ip f, '''f. 
An pJt<,rnativP formulat
iol! of sat.nrated i-:!"ts u~Ps 
a comhinat1on of 
mon• familiar concq;ts. 
• r J.!:> a 
• r is 
then r i-
•,.: E I' for all 
) iff for all ,. and 1, ·• if [ f- ·; 1;• 
Now uotlce that the thre
t' <imallest <.:ardinalitws 
for ~ in th1• d1;firnti<m uf 
saturatt:«l set:; l'!ad to th
n·e characteristic prnper
tie;,. Let r ho.· sr1t11rarHl 
If #/:l 0, Le .... \ iS empty. th
en \<Vif' ·"" 'Ii shows l v'. i.e. 
l is cunsisrent. 
To see tha1 any :.atur<H
f'd r is a t!wory, !Pt r ,. 4
;, th»u r ,~ L-'} f 0. ~(i 
v (c r (ill this GiSP -/h'i '""
 l I' Finally, if r ' ·,'. v 
theu r I +'' t htl!'i 
r n {•,c, it'} T 0, !-10 .,.; ( r or l;' Fr. i.c
 r ~- •;: IJf r 1.''. and therdnn• r
 is 
#~"" 21 Tu summariz». a 
saturntNl SN is a con:,;is
t1mt prinw 
Th11 umverse alsu bolus
. for if r is a cmmi:>tl'nt 
prnm' theory thn1 
r i- ~ 
'11 ... '' 
for some i n, and so
 rl, E: f. 
dw finiteness propNty) that t
lwH· an• 
v ( · · '1 .?,, l · · · i By imiurtion l' 
r·· 01 
Observation 4.2 For an
y 8C!Jilf'nf .,ysfrm S 
prrrp-
l'T!N and m wfnd1 lhc 1
,:ondu:;iuns Jrmctwn 1is 
a au:11unction. 
rated ifJ it t:J 1.1 cons1.qfl'nt pnmc t
hrnr!J. 
Satnrate<l sets are small
er than (or equal to J maxima
ily cornnst!"nt "'1'!tS. 
Indeed the consrruct.ion 
of a max1rua1ly consiste
nt set out ,,f a gh·en con-
1>istent set, as in tlw pr
(Jof of thr Lindenbaum Lem
ma for dallsiral 
does not involve limitat
ions on ~huiidiHg-mat<Ti<
tls". :;i..taximal-
ity is just the final stag<· of pil
in~~ up arbitrary formulas, 
while preserving 
consistency. In partial
 logic thio roustruetion
 of saturated st-ts is of
r1•n 
more restricted. As we w
ill see in t!w compleumes
s proof for l\:L satnrared
 
St:'tS ran be built into ano
ther set. The generaliza
tion of the Limhmbaum 
Lemma which we are a
hout tu 
wht;never this upper hou
nd is rich 
guarantt>es a successful 
rnnstructmn 
to int<'TsPct al! st•quem:
et. which 
Fe~;n.u.n::nALS OF l'.\ll
TlAL '.1ou,,L ;.,uu··· 
are ri1~rivabli~ frr1m a 
1dP<t 
Deft.nit. ion ·:i. 2 t\ 
,:,. L'.: r f 5 ,:::, .6. 
~et Hen' is the formal 
1: l.S eallrd an S-.mlur'ltor
 of a Sf't r 
A 0 
of t.his 
£ 1ff for all 
Observation 4.3 Sote th
at whawrer a Sl't I hns <l
fl S-.~atumtor 1t rrrnst }ys 
S«.·011.>!.Hent r ~;s ~l Al.~o 
not" that a 8et conlni.1.
,·d in a.ll '!.tii s11t11.n;tr1r.1. 
TIH• r<>adn ~li<1uld in r
mnd tl:int n baturatnr 
sistf'nt it:>dL awl tlm5 n
eed nnt be '.•ffiturated 1•1
trwr. 
nor have to b•· con·· 
A sarnrnrnr 
to gnwratf' a satara!Pd 
Ttw 1wxt n·sult formally 
expresses tlw Lindt•nbaum
-lik11 rr·snlt which w,·e 
\-Vt_;ri::.1 fur 
Lemrna 4.3 ((;1enerali1P<i Li
ndenbaum Lrmnm, 
t11i/ daffr1tw1i ~y.>terr1 m whi
rh i!W!fl•fllf"f'8 are takni to
 !:it· stf8 S 
mntriiri.~ tfu• structural rule
.~ START, l.··~!O''° H·:Vl!J'\: 
f!nd tTT mid $!1t11-
thc prnprTllJ 
lf A C 1.~ an S·.mt11mtur of
 r £. tht'n .\ 
cm1tmn., an S-.rn.tim1tcd
 .'id r· ~u.~h t.hr1f [ ~ r·. 
{ ; 1 L;-~~, f)t~ an e1uunt~rat
i(;n of A Slh~b that i:V•~ry r
·lcrnf"nt (ff"\ 
occ11rs 1rnmy 
times \Ve definl' a seq!W
ll!'P r such rhat A 
a sarnnnur of .. adi r, Th
t: limil of { r,} . b 1.h« d'"'-iH'd s-~atnr:HN!
 r· 
r,:c 
r,. 1 
r· 
r 
{ r,, 
r,. 
'I"ri 
... l 
"P'il,j 
if for all finit<" ;...\ 
r 'v'n t"s ~ 
otherw1H:' 
L• 
.:_\ ,., .\ 
Ab an immeditttP cuw•f'q
ti;;•nce ot thi;, ddillitinn.
 1.1<.itke tb;i.t 
l) tf r" " s ~ then ~ ,\ f. ~
 for ;ill fimt• _'), ·- [,' 
l} 
tilt' tinitN1t-ss property t
his anwunts w .\ 
sarurator of '''·.eh r,. 
awl >;O, Obso·vat1on 
..t.:J, L, c.: A .. and thHPfor1• 
r· ;\ 
'fo t•StabJish lhe saturati
on of f'• Wf' prme by mdH
CtlOU t>ll th•' nirdi· 
nality of ,'.':I r·1 A Hnt 
) Ti, r-s ~ am! :l ;3 finite 
~\ :~ [*' "f \j~ ft1r a.I! k 
• If A :\ 0 tIH!rJ r~ 
~. bEGlHSP of l i Sn (21 
hold.5 for 
thP ba!Jic StPp. 
• 
(2\ h•A<h for aa finite :. im
ch that #(.::.. ,\J r, {tbe 
indurtion i\ow
 lf't .:\be a finit.I" set w1th 
i ~':lr ;\ "'' n + 1 
and {:;4 1 ••••• 'Pk~+•} h<, a.r1 e
numPratmn of u A ~urh t
hat k :_.: k, 
for ail i ( { 1 .... , n + 1}. Th.: e
rmmcration 1;xist:1 becau~ ru
i these 
formulas appear i11finit<'
iy rmmy tinH's in {..,;.i. u
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immediati•ly have the desirNi result So. suppo:>e that v: kc' 1 r/; r· 
Then there exist~; a finite Stt u' c:: £ such that 
.,.'.Pkn+l R 2,' and.::.' (A ~) 
The Cl'T-rule entniis 
r .. ~.,.rk 1-s !l'.!l -{t•n·l} 
BPc&use !\ ~~ r hn.i W(' derive 
Tb1, induction 
Thus 
( .6.' 
( Q,,' ,) il 
rkn+• f-5 !\', -~ .. {.,:i,H+l }. 
can be beea11hP 
{hn+i}) A)"" . ... p1,,,} ""'n 
'Pk, E r* for SOTlH' I E: { l, .. 
r· ¥'- l'L B1°caus<' r· s; /\., W(c obtain 
{,.01c, ....• +·;,,}.and th,•rcfor,. 1lwre i.-• a 
So :~ r f'* 'I ¥j 
Because of tht> !initcm's~ property of th1• do·rivation sy<>t1•m S. we may 
CUUciUd!' that 1f {" f .. !:i Y~ th1m i here exist firute '.!UbSetS r' f" and >:' f. :f: 
such that r' f·s ~'. Thus. acrnrdini{ tu the ddimtion of I'*. thrre exbt& au 
n f£; uJ such that r f-s f,', and because of (2) we Ct>ndudf' I:'~ r· f: ~1, and 
thcr•'fore l: r· i ~i CJ 
GLL turns out to be <'Xtremdy ust'fol ln proving romplett>nPs~ results •in thf' 
basis of canouical Henkin rnodels. gud1 as fur l'v1. The upper bound mt:thod 
ali;o applies to completeuess proofs for f'Xtensious of !VI, e.g. constn.ictiYP 
with extra no11-persistn1t connectives. 
An important corollary of (;LL is th(· (gerwralized) ,,aturntwn !Pmma, 
which is in fact eq11ivalent tn GLL in £•very &'•qllPntial system that C<mtains 
H-l\.HJ:-:. 
Corollary 4.4 (Saturation lemma) If S is a dnivalwnal system as m 
Gl,L and r ils .6., thl'n there l'xi8t~ an S-8fltumted Mipt:rut r· of r .mrh 
that r· n .6. .= 'iJ. 
Proof. .!'<"otice that f i;1 A iff Ac = t:. -·D. is a saturator of I . For 2'.' b not 
a saturator of r {.;;} ~I: : r r· 1: and :r: c.·· = 11 ~ 3E · r :· I: and L; C il "'* 
rt- A. 
So, if r LI. then GLL shows that there is a satnratt'd r·· such that 
r ~ r· ~ D. 0 and therefore r· n LI. = 0. Conwrnely. assume tlw saturation 
lemma and A to be a i<.aturator of r. Then by the abow remark [ :1 Ar. so 
there is a saturated r· :.:> r such that r· r Ac ,... 0, i.e. r• c /\.. 0 
One useful ca;,p of the saturation lemma b when L!. is a siugleton sPt. If a 
formula +' E £. L5 not S-derivable from a set of assumptions I'. then there 
exists a saturated extension of r that do('S not contain <p. In the followin 
section we will show how these lemmas help us to obtain 
the partial system 1\11. 
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•1.2 Completeness 
In clas,;ical modal tbe n1n;,istN:t wrJrlds an' ;,H put iuto 
rnodP!: th•' ~fr·called carwrw:al (;f l!enkm mcH.!o>L 1 bh 
in thr· of 
Apan frr,rr; tlw 11bvinu" ,:frviaw.m frqrn tl.w das:.;1rc1l 
canonkal "a!uati"n function. whi•h now ha:, t•.J di>fim• b'lth trath 
1 ·)f or1H)O;\it:onal ~-/ariable~ _ t hP rfr1finiti1. 
relll,tiun l~ also ri1ffPrH1t 
ae<'l'Ssiblc• from r if D .. r C j., or. 
tlH."'W nmditio:ts ;ne not 
<1Cn'.'>'lib1" sat urat•'d ~t. 
Definition 4.5 Th•· l'vl 0 carwmcal model 
when· 
thto triplP 
Wl\l is t h<" Sf't of all 1\1-~aturi'l.tHi 
IRrv1.:.l ~' re~ ! 
\\1 ~p. p itWJ \'M'}'. f'\ 
to arnvv :it 2in 
M 
·p 
Thf· defimt1->1J of ii-,1 ernmn'l:i the• b:J;;!f stf'p for tiw ind.•1cr;V>.' rh•.' 
troth h'rnma, RM thar •A the inductmn stt~p nw 1mni~101M.l c•>llnfft 
The· ddinitJnn of Rl\1 ly >JI ates that '.' 
from r is fnnt;1me•i in HH· upp ... r bo"rnd 
this uppn bunnd io the ri>qmrl':nHmt that an 
f(JI!tain mor<, informattun than whal. i'l d•"t.>'nninNi &!'l bPing IJO'.i:"iiblP hv thf" 
world GLL will gmde 111; w!i<"m»PT 
~aturat•Yd Sf'!., m tLe trnrh li·mma Th•· •·r.senn· of 
int1-•nsinn;1l 
a suiiabll' s••tnrator 
Sine« ii I !!; not l'fjHiv<d"l!t to=- r "'·' ;\. Wf' nu'U bc·th thl". Upj)("l' 
and th<' !own huuud fur CHlOfli('ctl '..;;>vnthr:IP~~. if 
of thPse cnnditiou<; holds .. \ve can r;rnw• that thl"r<" '>1lb5'"t or imper:;(·r 
of.:::, whkh i..c, a,,,,.,,~.,ihi<' from r in the canonicc•l modi'!. 
Lemma 4.ti Let I' E ffM and .:.\ 
If lJ r .6. t,li,u th1'1',,. •·•xist» !!t L'.' ,;'.'). ;md1 that I'NM:.\' 
If A r tiwn there a.:.\' ) ~.\ "'""h tn&t ruM:i.·. 
Proof. Let r' .:\ WM For tlJ'• fir;,t r ~. w., 
will show that ..::. n () r is au l.Vl·sattlrntor 
then· is a il' ~nd1 that c r c ;:.\' LI. n 
finite 1: ';;: {, 
r Tt:en beeau:'><" GU. 
r. We ·will prove that for all 
r l·M }; E ,\ '' ff 
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The finiteness property of M then guarantees that A n o- f is an M-
saturator of o-r. 
Suppose o-r i-M E for finite E. Because D f <;:: 6 and A E WM, we 
certainly have E n 6 f. 0. We split E into a A-part, and a non-A pan: 
n-r1-M E--A.l:nA,anddefineq:= WC'B -A). ApplicationofR-TRl:E 
0 and L-MON yields: 
r 1-M Oq, O(A n E). 
Because f E WM, we obtain Da E f or O(A n l:) n r .f 0. The former 
disjunct contra.diets o-r ~ t.. because rr '1. A (6 E l"''M)· This means 
the latter disjunct should hold, which is just a reformulation of the desired 
conclusion in { 3). 
For the second implication assume that A s;;; o- f. We will show that 
o f is an M-saturator of D fuA. and so by GLL there is a A' such that 
n- r u A ~ A' ~ o- r. 
Suppose o-r,A f-M E. By the finitene1:>s property there exists a finite 
A' c;;:; A such that o-r. A' f-M 1:. So, if o:;.;: ff:\/':.'. M entails o- r. o 1-M 
:r:. L-TRUE 0 and L-MON entail 
I', 061-M OL 
Furthermore 6 E /':., because A is f\.1-saturated. Since 6 <; o- f. we have 
06 c r. and so r r-M Ol:, implying 1: n o-r f. 0. o 
Observation 4.4 Note that the first result of the previous lemma also 
holds whenever A is an M-saturator of o-r for r E WM. The condi-
tion of the second result can analogously be Wf'akened: let r E °l'VM and 
o-r be a saturator of~- These results also hold for all inferential exten-
sion.'! S of M. whefY' the canonical model for S, Afs i..1 defi11ed m the same 
way as for M, but then re,,tricted to the collection of S-saturated st!ts. 
We now have the auxiliary results to give a relatively fast proof of the 
truth lemma for system M. 
Lemma 4.7 For all r.p EC and aU M-saturated sets l': 
MM,l'f=r.p<-"}<jJEI' and lvIM,I'==J r.p~-ipEf 
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of i.p. The basic step 
p E P is immediate by the definition of VM. Since I' is deductively closed, 
we know by R-TRVE T that T Er and by Observation 4..1 that -.T f/. L 
which implies that the truth lemma aloo holds for the ba.~ic step 'P ~ T. 
The induction steps for the connectives -. and /\ are also straightfor-
ward. Only the case of 0 is left. Asswne the truth lemma to hold for 'P 
and consider Olp. There are four different cases. 
r 
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• First suppose D.p E r. The definition of RM tells us that all A such 
that r RM A contain '.{. The induction hypothesis shows MM' A I= <P 
for any accessible ~t ti.. and therefore ,\,J, r F Dip. 
• Suppose [i;,; ti r. Clearly 0 r tfM <{). by R-TRUF'. 0 and L-MON. The 
saturation lemma ensures the existen1.:e of an 1\.1-saturated set A such 
that O r <;:; 6 and p f/. A. Lemma 4.6 tells us that there exists an 
M-saturated subset A' of A such that f RMS Clearly <f) rt- A'. The 
induction hypothC'SiS entails MM. t,,' ~ :; ' hence .\.fM. r ~ f1:.;. 
• Suppose -.n.; '/: f. So for all A with rRMA that -..; ~ A. By 
the induction hypothesis JIM, 6 ~ .; for all such A. and therefori! 
MM.f tl n.; 
• Finally, let -o.,; E r. thlll ~:p E o-r Suppose ci-r. ~.; r-M t. 
By L-TRLJJ,; <> and L-MON we have r 1-M OE. This implies that 
Er. o-r ;;/= 0 So O r is an M-saturator of o-r u {-.i,:-}. ThM.-fore 
GLL ensures the existence of an ?wt-saturated ~et A such that o- f L: 
{-...;} c;; AC o-r. thus fRMA and 4 ..; ES So by the indul'tiun 
hypothPsis ~uM. D. -l '{;, hence MM' r ~ De; 
c 
Theorem 4.8 (Completeness M) The systf"111 M i.; completf Wtfh respN'f 
to partial Knpke model8, l.F. r i>=M A-'> r t-M 6 /of' ail r. A; c. 
Proof. SuppOSf' r rfM /':.. The saturation lemma gives us a.n 1\.1-saturat....! 
set l: such that ff E ll.Ild An l: -o 0. Because of Lemma 4.7 ,\.IM.~~ 6 
for alls E il, and MM. E F "I for all .,. Er. and therefore I' lfoM ~- c 
4.3 Finite models 
The dl'cidability of a modal logic (i.I'. of its mnbt'quence relation for fi-
nite set&) is nwstly shown by proving thP so-called finite modd properl'fl 
{F:'.v1P) for this logic (see <'.g. Hughes & Cresswell 198-lj. Thill means that 
C'\'l'ry uon-dt>nvable finite sequ<'m·e ('non-~quent'. for short) ha.'! a finite 
countermodel, i.f'. a model which shows the argument to bf' invalid. Thi' 
combination of completeness and F.\IP establishes decidability 
The rnmpleten~ proof of M in the previou11 section not only helps 
to draw the la.'lt conclusion (decidability), it also presents a way to gener-
ate finite countermodels. Wf' only have to modify the constnict10n of the 
canonical modi>] for M slightly. Thi' (infinite) model AIM is essentiatly a 
rnuntermodel for all non-sequl"IlU, whereas each finite countermodel will 
be constructed for just one non-sequent. The latter construction is pos.!lible 
!!ince we only have to consider a certain class of reln·ant formulas. If this 
restrkted class is (essentially) finite, this will result in a finite model. This 
selection, or filtration in technical terms, therefore depends on the set of 
relevant formula.-;. the filtration 1et in our terminology. The universe of the 
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finite countermodel will consist of subsets of the filtration set whirb are 
saturated with respect to this filtration set. 
Definition 4.9 Let S be a sequential derivation system for a language C., 
and 4> ~ C.. 
• A set r <; 4> is S-saturated up to <P iff for all A S:::: <I>: 
r t-s A => il n r 'f 0. 
• A ~ C, is an S-saturat.or up to 4> of r ~ 4> iff for a.Il A C: 4': 
r 1-s A -'* An A I- ~-
Observation 4.5 
• All S-.9aturated .,ets up to 4> arc S-consistent. 
• All S-consistent SP.ts are S·saturatcd up tu 0. 
• If 4> ~ 4>' £ C and f ~ 4>' is S-aaturated up lo 4>', the11 r n <I> i~ 
S-saturated up to <I!. 
So, in particular. all saturated sets are saturated np to its super~ts. \\'e 
arrive at restricted forms of GLL. a saturation lemma and a completeness 
theorem. 
Lemma 4.10 (Filtl'red GLL) Let S be a scqtLlmt system 1M m GLL and 
let 4> \;:;; C. If A <;; 4> is an S-sn.turator up to 4> of a set f s,;; 4>, then A 
contains an extension of r which is S-saturated up to <I>. 
Proof. By the same coru;truction as in GLL, where { .p;},E.., is a.n enumera-
tion of 4> such that every member occurs infinitely many times. Let r 0 = r 
and fn-.l = fn ~ {:p,.. if r,,,:; 1-s il ~An A-:/. 0 for all finite .6. ~cl>. 
and else r n+l = r , .. Analogously to the proof of GLL WP can show that 
the limit of this sequence {f,}.Ew is S-saturated up t.n tl>. 0 
Again we can rephrase this Lindenbaum Lemma as a saturation lemma for 
filtrations, which, modulo R-MON, is equivaJ<'nt to the filtered GLL. We now 
explicitly state the relationship between a saturator and non-derivability 
al.ready used implicitly in the proof of corollary 4.4. 
Lemma 4.11 If sequent system s contains rule R-MO.!'. th1m r t/ A i/J 
<p - A is a saturator up to if> of f. 
Proof. 4>- .D. is not a saturator off ~ 3E <;;: ii> : f I- E and En ii> - .D. = 0 $? 
3E c; ~ : f 1- E and E £ AU .pc tjo 3E c; A : f I- E <* (R·MON) f I- .D.. 
0 
Corollary 4.12 (Filtered saturation lemma) 
Let S be as in GLL. Assume 4> c;;; f, and f, A ~ 4>. If r f/s A then there 
exists a set E which is S-saturated up to <I> such that r <;:: E and .En il = 0 
To use the techniques which were developed in the preceding sections we 
would like to be able to switch from filtered saturated sets to ordinary 
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saturated sets if necessary. The following lemma will ju:,itify this switch in 
the sense: every set which ill $-saturated up to et> can be considered as the 
.P-part of an S-saturated set 
Lemma 4.13 Let S be a sequential derwatwn system as in GLL, and cf>;:;: 
c. r 15 S-satumff'd up t.o 4> 1JJ there exists 1m S-satumtFri st:l r· such that 
r* ri <I>= r. 
Proof. If f is an S-saturated St>t up to 4>, it is its own saturator up to 4>. 
so by Lemma 4.11 r is 4> - r. The ordinary saturation lemma. produces 
an S-saturated set r· ~ r such that r· r ( 4> - f) = 0. In all. by a 
simple set-theoretic argument f ""' r• n 4>. The converse is a special case 
of Observation 4.5, taking <f>' ~ £. 0 
ObRervation 4.6 By thl' lrut lemma, if cf> <;: 4>' ~ [, and f u S-saturated 
up to 4> then the,,.,. e.cists a set [' which u S-saturated up to C.1 and for 
whu:h f' :1 <I> ;::-- r. To gf't such a set, use f* as in the proof abot'f', and put 
I''zf*n.P'. 
Theorem 4.14 (F~P ~f} M haJJ the finite modd propt·rty 
Proof Let. [ if M il for finitP [,A c_;;; £. Call the wt of all s11bformula".I of r 
and il: Subff. A;. Let the filtration set cl> br the set of all subformulas of 
element!> of rand 6.. and their negations. 1.e cl>= S'i.!b(f. .:ll u~S'ubif. :i\ 
We will show that then• exists a finite morM J/~1 ""!\\.~.Rt.\/~) EM 
which contains a world that verili~ all formula<i m [ and dot>S not verifv 
any element of A. This can be established by taking .Wt to bi' the -i-
filtration of the M-canonical model MM. Define H'~ to bf. the llt.'t of all 
sets that atf' 1\1-saturated up to tit. Beeau.'«' 4' is finite wt. is also finite. 
Furthermore. let l/~(p, E) == 1 iff p E l: and i~(p. 1:) = 0 iff ~p E 'E. and 
finally put 
(i) ERtA <=:> D E <; 0 and (ii) -><; E 8 => ~o'I' f' !: for all;; E ff <P 
We will prove the truth lemma for this filtration 
J.1~. E f= ;p ~.; t- E and.\!~. l: =.;:~--...,EE for all f! c Sub(f.~J 
A part from the restrktion to Sub([, A )-elements, the inductive proof is 
similar to that of the preceding truth lemmas. Thi' basic step for elements 
of 'P is immediate by tht> definition of V~ If T E Sub(f, .D.) the result is 
obtained by E 1-s T and E lf s .., T for all elements E of H-'~. For negation 
and conjunction the induction steps are- also quite easy, by the induction 
hypothesis and the chosen filtration. The only step left is for the modal 
operator. Suppose D:p E Sub(f • .6.). Again we consider four !!eparate cases. 
• If O:p E: 1: then, by the definition of Rt. fur all 9 which are accessible 
from Ewe infer that ip E 0. The induction hypothesis gives Aft.. 0 I= 
:p for all such 0, &nd therefore Mt.. E I= D:p. 
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• If Dip</. 2:, take E' to be an M-saturated set such that E ~ E'n<I>. By 
Lemma 4.13 there is such a set I:'. Clearly >:' llM D:p and therefore 
0 · E' lfM <p. As in the tmth lemma proof for I\11, there must be an 
l'vf-saturated set El' such that o-E' ~ 0' r; o-~' with <P </. 0'. Take 
e =- 8' n <Ii. Then, by Lemma 4.l:J, 8 E W~. Because o-L -== 
o-(E' n <I>) = D - E' :1 0-<1> c;: o-E' n <I>. we have on the one hand 
o- E ( 8' n 4> '"" e. On the other hand. if ...,1/: E 8 and Dtf• E <I>, 
we obtain -.Di;.• C t' and -.07J.• E of>, and therefore ~Oi,'1 E L. This 
implies that 0 is accessible from E in 1Wtt: ERte. Since;:</. e. the 
induction hypothesis shows .:uti, e ¥:<f. consequently Mt1 , 'L ji: o<i-'· 
• If ~Dip r:/ E then we may conclude, by the definition of Rt and thf' 
induction hypothesis, that Mtt. E ¥! no?. 
• If ~o.; C E then --.Ocp must be a member of every S-saturated exten-
sion of E, and certainly for an S-saturated E' with E' n 4> = E, 
which exists by Lemma 4.13. So. by the proof of the ordinary 
truth lemma of 1\1, there exists an M-saturated set ~, such that 
o-r:' U {-.y;} <;: 0' <;: o- E'. Again, take 0 ""8' n <PE n·~. By the 
same argument as in the case D<p f/. E, we have I:R~S. Moreover, 
~~ E 8, because-.,, E If>. Since ;p C Sub(r, D.). we infer by induction 
that Mt1• 6 :9 '-P· and so Mf!1. I: :9 D;p. 
This completes the truth lemma restricted to Sub(f', A) on the finite modf'l 
Mtt. 
Because I', A £ <I> and r iiM 6, there exists an M-saturated set L up to 4' 
such that r <:;:: l: and AnE = 0, according to the filtered saturation lemma. 
Also because r, A ~ Sub(f, t1) we conclude. by the restrictrd tmth lemma 
above, that Jl,1~. EI= I' for all 1 Er and Mti, 'E lot= 1' for all o ("'A. 0 
By the compll'teness and the finite model property of l'v1 we conclude that 
Corollary 4.15 ~M is a de..cidable relation ou finite arguments. 
If, on the one hand, f l=M D. for finite f and b., then. by the completeness 
theorem for l\tf, f i-M ~. thus by enumerating proofs of possible sequents 
the valid inference will eventually turn up. If. on the other hand, r FM 6 
for finite I' and b.. tht>n by the FMP there is a finite countermodel lvf 
which verifies all of r and nothing of 6. SinC"e the finite models for the 
language restricted to the propositional variables occurring in r and b. (i.e. 
P n Sub(f, 6)) can also be enumerated, the invalid argument will turn up 
as well. 
We have proved a so-called strong finite model property. Thi!> means 
that we do not need completeness here because the above countermodel can 
never be larger than 2#Subff.Ar+I. So we can give a st.rict upper hound for 
finding a countermodel for r tfM b.. We only need to check models with 
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Jei-;s worlds than this upper bound The only valuations m-er these models 
are valuations which determine the propositional variables appearing in 
Sub(f,b.). 
5 Inferential extensions 
In this sectioil we \'lrill be concerned with a class of schematic extensions 
of 1\.1 and with finding corresponding model-theoretic characterizations. 
In rla.ssical modal logic well-known schemes such as (T; C..p !- ;;, !4) 
D..p I- ODcp, (5) 0.p I- DO,,::, (B) :,:> ~ 00.p and (GJ ODp r- wO;p are char-
acterized by well-defined classes of frames. For example. T corresponds to 
reflexive frames, and B to syrnmetr1c fram.-s. These logics all fa.II within 
a wide and wcll-characterizablf' class of modal iogks, where the added 
schematic extt>nsions are of the form 
O"D\:? I- O"'<)n;,c 
Snd1 a S<'hema is denoted as G~1 ,, and is calll'd a (gf'neralizedJ Geru-h rule 
The indices refer to the corresp~nding number of CJ- and 0-itl'rl\tlons So 
for example 
T G o.1 Go 1 <l Gu' 
= 0,0,4""' 2.0 an 5"" I.I 
G~;'.n can he characterizoo by the class of frame:> with 
rrlation R such that 
an acceMiLility 
':/:r,y,z · xRky and .rR"'z 4 3w · i;R'u· and zR"u 
Here R" is defined recursively by: 
gi::::: {(w.w)iwEW} 
R"+ 1 "'" R" • R 
It can be proved that all these logiC!! arc frame-rnmplete. that is complete 
with respect to the class of models which ~hare tht> frame property In 
other words. every non-sequent hai- a countermodel m the corresponding 
frame cla.•1s. 
In the sequel we will try to find similar i:haracterizations for extensions 
of M. Partial modal logic will turn out to be quite different from cla.ss1cal 
modal logic in some respects. For example, in partial modal l~ic there 
is in general no frame complt'tr>ness with respt>ct to a sing!P rule such aa 
G!;~ 11 • but there is frame completeness with respect to 
G'<.1 +G"'·n 
m,n k~f · 
Also, there is model completeness with respect to G~' .. (without its con-
trapositive). So wt> believe it is fair to say that, although the overall picture 
of completeness in partial modal logic is somewhat more complicated, it 
is alw more subtle a.nd interesting than in normal modal logic. Before we 
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turn to Geach extensions, we will briefly view extensions of l\11 from a more 
general point of view. 
From now on, let S be a finitP schematic extension of M. ln particular. 
the extended system is a<mumed to satisfy the finiteness property. ~otice 
that GLL and the saturation li>mma still hold. Define the S-canonicai 
model Ms like MM. but now with respect to S, of course. The universe 
Ws of the model consists of all S-saturated sets. Since every S-saturated 
set is an M-saturated set, Afs is a submodel of MM. 7 The accessibility 
relation Rs and valuation function Vs are thus, respectivPly, RM and VM 
restricted to Ws. Finally we note that the counterpart of the comparison 
Lemma 4.6 holds for S as well. So we can prove the truth IPmma for .\Js 
and finally establish a very general and strong completeness theorem for S. 
Theorem 5.1 (Completeness S) A system S f'-Xf.endmg M is sound and 
complete with respect to S-modcls, in particular with respect to Afs. f 1-s 
6 (;;.} r FMs 6 for all r, 6 <;:; £. 
Proof. For the soundness in thP general proposition, we find that, by defiui-
tion. S-models preserve the rules of S. The completeness half for the special 
case of the canonical model follows from the earlier argument, which shows 
that iWs L'I a rountermodel to each non-sequent. To prove the missing parts, 
it suffices to show that Ms is an S-model. So, lPt I' I- 6 and Ms. E I= f. 
then by the truth lemma r <;:; E. so (L-MON) L I- 6. and hence by S-
saturation, there is a J E A such that 5 E E, and so again by the truth 
lemma Ms, :E I= o. 0 
Although this strong completeness theorem is perfectly general, it has the 
disadvantage that the resulting canonical model (or the class of S-models, 
for that matter) may be entirely chaotic. We would like to give character-
istics of the models, preferably in terms of frames. or otherwise structural 
properties. This is what we will look for in the next few subsections. To 
make the exploration of such frame and structure properties possible. one 
more lemma is extremely useful. The lemma identifies !;M on canonical 
models as set inclusion. 
Lemma 5.2 Let S be a schematic extension o/M which sati.Jfies the finite-
ne.u property, and Afs = (Ws, Rs. Vs} its canonical model as described 
above. If f and A are S-,,aturated sets, then 
r ~ ~ $:=? r i;;;u. A 
Proof We will prove, for the =>-result, that the relation C is a bisimulation 
over lvfs: 
(~ •Rs) ~ (Rs• ~)and (2 •Rs) ~ (Rs• d). 
In the first case we need to show that for all r, r', A' in Ws such that 
7 Teclmically speaking it is even 11 generated submodel of l"·IM. generatNi by W8 . 
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r \;; I' and f' Rst:.', there exists a .i E Ws such that r Rs.:l and A £;;; A'. 
Lem.ma 4.6 (for SJ guarantees this existence. because 
o-r k o-r'::;;: .:.\' 
The second case follows from the second property in Lemma 4.6. If f' ::;2 f 
and r Rs.:l then we know 
A ~ o- r c: o -r· 
and therefore, according to Lf'mma. 4.6, thPre exists .:l' E' n·s such that 
A C A' and I'' Hst:.'. The definition of Fs gives r C \ts L 
The other direction of the lemma. <= LS ju;;t a COI15<'qUence of the persis-
tence for [M and the truth lemma for S. 0 
5.1 A simple example 
In the minimal system M of partial modai logic· thl' law of contrapo,,ir.inn 
is lacking: r l=M 6 p ~A i=M -r Thill creates a.n interesting penpective 
on its modal f'Xtensiuns. Adding a modal rule such as r.; r- .p doe!> not 
imply it& contrapositive ...,<P '-- ~n,:. For example, n1ll5ider the simple two 
world M-model of Figure !'i. 
All worlds in M that verify fl<P also verify .;. Therefore the model 
satisfies rule O:p f- <.p. which we will call TD henceforth. However. tht' modPl 
does not satisfy the rule op i- 0-.,; = G~:?. which we \\ill call TO henceforth. 
So TO is logkally independent of TD. when WC' compare them as ext.-mioll.'I 
of M. Consequently Dr.; I- ,.., defines a wider dasll than reflexive models only. 
In order to find corr~ponding model-theoretic conditions for the ex-
tPn.t1ions of M with rules such as TD, we nl"f'd, apart from accessibility 
constraints. a structural comparison of the informational content of worlds 
in a p;irtial Kripke model. In the example in figurf' 5, <P is true on all 
worlds which verify Dip for arbitrary ;: E £. because the left-hand world is 
a modal extension of the right-hand world. Informally, eVPry world "sees a 
part" of it.self. A corresponding ronstraint for ;p l- Or.; singles out models 
in which every world extend:; at leaat one accessible v.-orld. 
In fact the notion of modal extension [M enables us to formulate dif-
ferent forms of "pseudo-reflexivity". as were conceptually drscribt'd before. 
Definition 5.3 A partial Kripke model M-= (W, R. \lj is aid to be small-
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reflexive iff 
'Vx 3y : xRy and y t;;;M x. 
Such a model i::; called big-reflexive iff 
'fix ':1y : xRy and x ~M y. 
The class of small-reflexive modeL<i are denoted by TD and thf' big-reflexive 
models are \llTitten as TO. 
Theorem 5.4 TD "" M + Dip f- <p 111 sound and complete with respect to 
TD. TO - M + <.p f- Or.pi.~ sound and compll!te with respect to TO. 
Proof. Soundness is straightforward and thus left to the reader. For com-
pleteness, Theorem 5.1 tells UR that it suffices to show that 
MTo E TCl and MTo E TO. 
First we prove that AfTc i.5 small-reflexive This can be d•me by an 
applicatiun of Lemma 4.6. Let r E R'TC· By De; t-Tc "' we nmclude that 
o-r ( r, which means, according to Observation 4.4, that RTdL ~)and 
~ <;; f for some ~ E ~·Fn:1- The latter conclusion also yields ~ Cr::; r 
(Lemma 5.2). and so AfTu is small reflexive. 
Big reflexivity for MTo can he obtained in the same fa.c;hion, using the 
fact that f i;: o- f for all f C lVT<..-. and application of Lemma 4.6 and its 
generalization in Observation '1.4. O 
5.2 Geach rules 
A completeness result for the full class of partial Geach systems M + 
G~1 n, using hM· is presented in Jaspars {199•1). We will not go into the 
technicalities of the proof, but simply present the result in the following 
theorem. 
Theorem 5.5 The logic G!;1,. is sound and complete unth respl"ct to the 
collection of models M -= (W. 0R. V) which arr 'semi-k, l, m, n confluent': 
Vxyz En•: xRky and xRm:: ="> 3vu: E lV: v !;M w, yR1v and zR"w. 
Though quite general, the completenei;s theorem for Cea.eh rules supplies 
sufficient information about the structure of the modeb. Insight into its 
applicability may be facilitated by the following examples. In Tablf• l, the 
left column lists the names of some Geach extensions of M, given in the 
middle column. The right rnluron giVPs the corresponding constraints on 
the order within the models Af = (H'', R, V). 
In agreement with our earlier terminology for pseudo-reflexivity, the 
four listed properties may be baptized small-symmetry, small-buclidicity, 
small-transitivity and big-transitivity, respectively. 
,,..,.... 
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TABLE i Some ronditions for geach l"Xtension!I 
MB:J ,:: f- :JO,:- j '1x, y: xRy => 3z : yR:: and ;;: C::M z 
I MSC O"' r- UO+' V.r, 71. z : xRy and xR;: => :lu:. zRw and ll ~M u., 
M4C n.p f- C.: Dip 
I M4(> I OO:p f- Oy: 1 - ' J. 
'J:x, y. z : xRy and yR::: =;- 3w: xRw and u: ~M z i 
.,.,. " z: xRy and yRz -=> :iw: xRw and zLM 111 
5.3 Intermediate worlds . 
There is an easy completeness proof for thr system T = 1\1 + TO _., TO 
with respC'Ct to the class of partial models with a r1>flexiw frame, for note 
that if r is a T-saturated set. then o-r ~ f by TD and f <;:; o-r by T<>, 
so r RTr· Notice that, in compariron with our pre5f'nt set-up, reflexivity 
is a strongPr restriction than small- and big-reflexivity togrther. The pos-
sibility of Tl'!ltricting to the class of reflexive morlf'!s ran be understood by 
the following observation It tnrru. out that partial Kripke models are in-
SPnsitive to addiug and removing so-called mterrned111.tt- wuddt; \\'henever 
a world w in a partial Kripkl' model AI has twc, accessible world" l' and u, 
then every intermediate world x of v and u in Al. meaning u !:::M x CM u, 
can be taken to bf' accessibll' from w as well. without chang1ng tn1th and 
falsity in u·. 
Observation 5.1 For :\I -=- (W, R. V) E M. let IL' E W 1>t' such that for 
certain 1'.u En:. wR1 1 and wRu. Suppo.se then ta an :r E :\/ .mch litat 
v C:M x ~M u, and let Al' ~ (W, R'. q whi::re R' = R ·_j { {u·. xH. Then 
M, w ~ ; <=> }\,/'. w F" ip fvr all '+.' E C 
(The proof is by induf'tion on thr strul·ture of formulas; the O and -0-steps 
follow from thl' per:.istencl' r!"'!iult for i:;M ) 
In a model which i5 both big- anrl !lmall-reftexiw_ every world has accl'!!S 
to a larger and a smaller world. That is. tht> uriginal V.'Drlrl is an intt>rmr-
diate world. and coukl tht>reforl' b .. as!iumed to be self-accessiblf' as well 
without losing or gaining information. In this straightforward wa.y we can 
transform ev1>ry model which is big- and small-reflexive into a reflexive one. 
6 Summary 
We have illustrated the idea of partial modal logic {i.e. modal logic- '11rith a 
partial semantics) using one basic system, called !v1 ht>re. and its various 
extensions. Although the subject is not classical. the presentation was 
highly cla.s5ical After defining the language and its semantics. we gave a 
sequential inference system. Complett>ness of the sequent system was shown 
using a canonical Henkin model with saturated sets linking (inft.rential) 
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syntax and semantics. Then decidability of the inference relation followed by means of the finite model property. Finally, we showed how to extend the sequent system and restrict the class of admissible models in order to incorporate so-called Geach rules. Most applications related tu belief and knuwll"'dge. for example, only use Geach rules, thus showing the significance of these extensions. As was pointed out iu the introduction, we restricted ourselves to just one type of partial modal logic. but the following notes suggest some other directions in this area. 
7 Historical notes 
The root11 of partiality and the link to three-valuPd logir will have been made clear in the other "fundamental" contributious to this volume. Apart from the compreheru;ivc introduction by Van dcr Hock and Meyer (see Chapter 3, this volume), standard texts on modal logic arP Hughet1 and Crl.'sswcll (1984}. Chella.s (1080) and Bull and Segerbcrg (1984). in order of incrt>asing intricacy. Here Wf' focus on partial modal logk. An early combination of partial and modal logic is Segerb(>rg ( 1967), where the ronnrctives are characteri7.ed by 'weak Kleene' tmth tables. and several non-standard interpretations are given to necessity. Schotch et al (1978) present a system in which the underlying propositional logic is Lukasil*Wicz' three-valued logic La. although necessity is given the tf'xt interpr!ltation. Finally Morikawa {1989) proposes a family of modal log-ics based on arbitrary three-valued propositional logics and various non-standa.rd interpretations for necessity (yet different from Segerberg'sj. one with only classical output values, anothl'r which is "weak" in thl' !;ense that Op is undefined when ip is undefined in some alternative. The move to pa.rtialize the worlds was made independently by several authors. most explicitly by Humberstone (1981) and Barwise (198lj. In fact even Hintikka's original formulation (in Hintikka 1962) of hib 'model sets' had a partial element in it, which, however, was soon eliminated. Ao account of completeness and definability for partial modal logic is given in Thijsse (1990) and Thijsse (1992, part I), where the relevant pa-rameters are valuation type (partial and/or incoherent), truth/fal.aity con-ditioru, single or split accessibility, validity kind ("always true" vs. "never false") and rule c.onr.ept ('absolute', as in classical Necessitation, vs. 'rela-tive', as in strong consequence). In these terms the system presented here may be characterized as relative verification on partial and r.oherent mode.ls with standard truth/falsity conditions and single accessibility. Failure of contra.position. as in our system, is considered by Blami>y ( 1986) to be a good reason for replacing strong ("positive") consequence '•~ h'"'reUed ("full") consequence. See also Muskens (1995) and 
r t:ro,,....,,_D 
Langholm (Chapter 11. We obviously do not agree. To mention but one strange effect of the imposed symmt>try; then I for coherent morfi>ls) neithf'r ex falsn nor tertium non datur is valid, but the "11mficat1on'" of these rules holdb in the form +: /I -.,:; I== U.! v -.?J;. 
Our basic system M (without rules for T) was called M"' in ThijsSt: I 199:.!). when• the derivation system resembles that of natural deduction, rather than the sequential format from Jaspars ( 1994) w;e<l here. The completeness proof for 1\..1+ contained repeated Lindenbaum construrtions. which :UP avoided here by CLL and th(' saturation lPmma. The latter was called 'generalized Lindenbaum Lemma· in Thijsse ( 1992}. but is in fact a slight generalization of the saturation lemma in Troolstra and van Dalen ( 1988). An alt!'mative i11 to 11se normal forms as in Ja.span l 1993) The concept of saturated sets can be- traced back to Ac-zel (1008) and Thomason { 19681. where they are used to give completeness proofs for intuitionistic predicate logic Veltman ( 19&5) uses sat1m1.ted :wt.s for a completeness proof of hi!! data logic Our defimtmn (Jf 'saturated' and our notion of S-saturator are from Ja.spars ( HJ!J.JJ Snt'irntf'ff S<r~ts may aL.,._1 be used in drcumsc:ribing knowledge iJ<l.'*d on a parual logic (see \'an d<'r Hoek, Jaspars and Thijsse 199-1} 
Other information orders are reqmred for u1udal principles such as ,: ·" o .... .,._., 1- ..!., which is captured by the class of partial 1'ripkP modi>is in wh1ch every world only has arces<; to worlds which are cuhtrn•l with iht· initial worlcl. Two world~ w and v in a model JI art' propositmna.Jly coherent if there exists no propositional variahlf' p that h& ha..~ differt>ut truth \·alues in wand u. Such a pair is (modally) coherf>nt if there exi11ts a bisimuiation Z on M such that wZ1· and ail pail'!! in Z are propositionally cohert>m. AltcrnativP orrtf'ring relations are studied in Ja.spars (1994). 
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